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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that “every new invention, every new
want which it occasioned, and every new desire which craved satisfaction
were steps toward a general leveling [of society].”2 The changes wrought
by the growth of Internet use reaffirm the truth of the statement. The
Internet has created new opportunities for communication and expanded
the reach of speakers more than any medium yet conceived.
“Unlike thirty years ago, when ‘many citizens [were]
barred from meaningful participation in public discourse by
financial or status inequalities, and a relatively small
number of powerful speakers [could] dominate the
marketplace of ideas,[,]’3 the internet now allows anyone
1

D. Wes Sullenger is a former law professor who is now a partner with the Sullenger
Law Office in Kentucky. The author wishes to thank his former student Tony Lee for
providing a sounding board and editorial assistance on this article. The author also
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2
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 4 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner, eds.,
George Lawrence, trans., 1999).
3
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005) (quoting Lyrissa Barnet Lidsky, Silencing
John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 894 (2000)).
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with a phone line to ‘become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’”4
[2] This vast expansion in communication capabilities has wrought
notable changes in society. As one might expect, the Internet has changed
the way people receive news5 and make decisions.6 The Internet’s growth
into a mainstream medium7 has even effected a change in the
government’s interaction with citizens as well as the way politicians
campaign.8
[3] The Internet promises to “enhance an ‘uninhibited, robust, and wideopen’ debate on public issues by improving our ability to become
informed about public issues and to discuss those issues actively.”9 The
ever-increasing number of Internet users in America10 has led some
academics to assert that citizens will directly affect policy by voicing their
concerns to legislators directly, via the Internet, when they believe action
should be taken.11 The recent development of “blogs” has made this
prediction increasingly viable.12 Through the use of blogs, speakers can
4

Doe, 884 A.2d at 455 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 896-97 (1997)). One
should note that the Doe court cites to the wrong pages of the Reno opinion. The quoted
portion is actually located at 521 U.S. at 870.
5
See The Pew Research Center For the People and the Press, News Audiences
Increasingly Politicized: Online News Audience Larger, More Diverse, http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=834 (last visited June 7, 2007) (noting the
number of people who receive news from traditional sources has declined while the
number of people receiving their news from the Internet increased from two percent in
1995 to twenty-nine percent by 2004).
6
See Burst: Online Ads Make Impression; Internet Primary Source for Purchase Info,
http://marketingvox.com/archives/2006/04/20/burst_online_ads_make_impression_intern
et_primary_source_for_purchase_info/
(last visited June 1, 2006) (explaining that over fifty-seven percent of Internet users say
the Internet is their primary source of information about products and services they buy).
7
See infra Part II.C.2.b.
8
See also infra Part II.C.3.
9
David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information
Superhighway (Where Are the Public Forums on the Information Superhighway?), 46
HASTINGS L.J. 335, 341 (1995) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964)).
10
See infra Part C.3.
11
LAWRENCE GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC 149 (1995).
12
See infra Part II.C.3.
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address Internet users half-way around the world or narrow the reach of
their speech down to an individual conversation with another Internet user
on the same street.13
[4] This article considers the First Amendment implications of employing
this technological growth in the political arena. Analyzing the initial
experiments with direct democracy in colonial America provides a
framework to explain the effect the Internet could have on the democratic
system.14 Direct democracy started with the town meeting style of
government in New England. A brief examination of the Founders’
reaction to that system, however, shows they created a representative
democracy as a buffer to direct citizen control.15 This article will then
consider the modern calls for direct democracy,16 including a discussion of
the nature of direct democracy17 and modern experiments in direct
democracy.18 This article also analyzes the societal changes forged by the
Internet, as well as the belief by some that these changes justify a
contemporary transformation to a direct democracy.19 Lastly, the
evolution of the political system, in an effort to adapt to the development
of the Internet, must be evaluated in order to complete the roadmap for the
discussion.20 This examination includes a discussion of the contemporary
formation of blogs and the effect of their invasion into America’s
democratic system.21
[5] The substantive constitutional discussion is based on a hypothetical.
This article assumes a hypothetical member of Congress, seeing the power
of the Internet to connect with constituents, chooses to maintain a blog on
his or her official website. The legislator uses the blog to post topics of
current political interest and to solicit opinions from constituents on the
position the legislator should take on the issues. While this arrangement
likely would have some political benefits in terms of making constituents
13

Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (2005).
See infra Part II.A.
15
See infra Part II.A-B.
16
See infra Part II.C.
17
See infra Part II.C.1.
18
See infra Part II.C.
19
See infra Part II.C.2.b.
20
See infra Part II.C.3.
21
See infra Part II.C.3.a.i.
14
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feel empowered and important, it would also raise concerns from the
legislator’s perspective. The legislator, for example, would be concerned
that some constituents would post statements that other constituents would
find degrading, offensive, or profane. To combat the potential harm to the
legislator’s reputation from such statements, the legislator might want to
take precautions, such as screening messages, altering some content, or
removing certain messages.
[6] This article considers the constitutionality of these possible reactions
from the legislator. The article applies a traditional First Amendment
analysis to the issue.22 After defining the contours of the modern public
forum doctrine,23 the article considers the status of blogs, concluding the
public forum doctrine should apply to them.24 Finally, the article
discusses why the application of the public forum doctrine to blogs should
be problematic to legislators. This discussion demonstrates that the
hypothetical legislator’s blog should be classified as a limited public
forum in which the remedies the legislator seeks to use to control the blog
will be deemed unconstitutional.25
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: FROM TOWN MEETING TO THE
INTERNET
[7] America’s government has undergone dramatic changes. During the
colonial period in America, colonists in various locales in the New
England colonies governed themselves through town meetings. The
massive shift, of course, came after independence when the Framers of the
Constitution adopted a representative form of government. As technology
has changed society, though, some people have begun calling for a return
to direct democracy. This section explores the contours of the debate.

22

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
24
See infra Part III.B.1.
25
See infra Part III.B.2.-3.
23
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A. COLONIAL TOWN MEETING GOVERNMENTS
[8] Colonial American society, particularly in New England, was based on
townships.26 As such, government was addressed at the town level through
town meetings.27 The town meeting system provided a political life that
was both truly democratic and republican.28
[9] Town meetings were assemblies of a town’s residents for purposes of
settling matters of common concern.29 While each town meeting differed
somewhat in form, the general equality of condition among the people in
the townships let every resident influence the laws.30 The residents
discussed and deliberated public matters at these assemblies.31 Through
the meetings, the residents enacted local ordinances32 and handled other
matters such as watching over any Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Scots, blacks,
or transients in the town and providing for the local livestock.33
[10] Eligibility to participate in town meetings varied, however. In
Massachusetts, one had to be a member of the Puritan church and granted
citizenship by a vote of the town in order to vote in the meeting.34 Other
residents could attend and speak but could not vote.35 Other colonies had
similar requirements.36
[11] The town meeting system worked well in providing a voice to those
impacted by the decisions of the governing bodies. Still, towns needed

26

See WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION: 1660-1713, 17 (1968);
see also DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 57-58.
27
OSCAR THEODORE BARCK, JR. & HUGH TALMAGE LEFLER, COLONIAL AMERICA, 80
(1958); see also CRAVEN, supra note 26, at 24.
28
See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 56.
29
CRAVEN, supra note 26, at 24.
30
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 3.
31
See id.
32
See BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 80.
33
2 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 178 (1964).
34
BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 94-95.
35
Id. at 95.
36
In New Haven, for example, voting was limited to those who were church members,
had been admitted by the general court as “free burgesses,” and had taken a “freeman’s
charge.” See ANDREWS, supra note 33, at 165.
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individuals who could administer town affairs between meetings.37 To
provide for consistent governance, residents elected a group of
“selectmen” at an annual town meeting. The selectmen were the officers
who oversaw local matters between meetings.38 These officials included
the town clerk, constable, and other officers found necessary.39
[12] In addition to performing their role as administrators of the township,
selectmen also played a role in the colonial government. The town
selectmen met with the royal governor and his assistants to lobby for the
political desires of the colonists.40 Thus, “the town meeting was the
sounding board of public opinion on all important local, and sometimes
colonial, problems.”41
[13] This system of government worked well in the New England
colonies. After independence, though, the Framers removed the direct
democracy component from American governance. As we will see,
though, the People never lost their yearning for a direct say in government.
B. THE FRAMERS REJECT DIRECT DEMOCRACY
[14] Their experience being governed from overseas left the Founding
generation distrustful of centralized power because of its detachment from
those affected by legislators’ actions.42 Representatives to a large central
government could not know most of their constituents.43 Had they been
given representation in Parliament, the colonists feared their
representatives would “easily lose a sense of connection with their
constituents when living in a grand imperial city an ocean away, rubbing
37

In some colonies, town meetings occurred no more than once each year. See CRAVEN,
supra note 26, at 24.
38
Id.; see also BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 80 (describing how in Plymouth
colony, residents elected local officials at town meetings). In Massachusetts Bay,
residents elected seven “select men” who administered town matters. Id. at 95.
39
See CRAVEN, supra note 26, at 24; see also BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 95
(explaining that in Massachusetts, selectmen also elected additional officials not chosen
by the residents).
40
See CRAVEN, supra note 26, at 25-26; see also BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 90.
41
See BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 262.
42
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 40 (2005).
43
Id.
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elbows with English aristocrats and haughty diplomats.”44 Thus, after
independence, the Founders set out to create a reliable and stable but
decentralized system of government.
[15] Although they were revolutionaries, the Founders distrusted
democracy.45 They feared common people with true power would give
political control to ambitious politicians rather than the elites capable of
putting the public interest above factional desires.46 The Founders
minimized this possibility by virtually removing from the People the
ability to vote directly on important matters.47 To ensure all citizens could
look after their own interests, however, the Founders separated the
national government from state and local governments.
Citizens
participated directly in the latter through their influence over the
politicians and political bodies that resided close to them.48
[16] The extent to which the People should be involved in political
decisions, however, divided even the Framers. Not long after the
founding, ideological parties began forming.49 These parties arose in
response, among other things, to differing views on the role of the
common people. James Madison defended the rise of political parties in
1792. He described Federalists, without using the term, as “more partial
to the opulent than to the other classes of society” and, therefore,
“wish[ing] to point the measures of government less to the interest of the
44

Id.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 16 (2005).
46
See id. at 18.
47
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson
ed., 1888) (arguing that election of senators by state legislatures instead of citizens would
result in senators
less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of
the reach of those occasional ill humors, or temporary
prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies,
frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice
and oppression of a part of the community, and engender
schemes, which, though they gratify a momentary
inclination or desire, terminate in general distress,
dissatisfaction, and disgust.).
48
See AMAR, supra note 42, at 184-85.
49
See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 19-26 (detailing development of Federalist
and Republican parties).
45
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many than of a few.”50 On the other side, Madison said without referring
to the Republicans by name, were
those who believing in the doctrine that mankind are
capable of governing themselves, and hating hereditary
power as an insult to the reason and outrage to the rights of
man, are naturally offended at every public measure that
does not appeal to the understanding and to the general
interest of the community.51
[17] Nevertheless, despite this criticism, in the 1790s, Madison joined
with Thomas Jefferson’s Republican faction opposed to the Federalist
agenda.52 Jefferson and Madison believed the Federalists had taken the
government from the American people.53 Jefferson felt the Federalists,
though duly elected, were betraying the spirit of the Revolution by
expanding the federal government, aligning the nation more with England
than France, passing the Alien and Sedition Acts limiting speech, and
creating a new army.54 Like the Federalists, Jefferson feared the
concentration of political power. He viewed the concentration of power
into a single body as the cause of the destruction of “liberty and the rights
of man in every government which has ever existed under the sun.”55 For
Jefferson, however, this distrust of centralized power meant ultimate
power should be diffused into smaller governments.
[18] Jefferson believed the citizens of each state had a natural right to
control their own domestic affairs.56 However, his states’ rights
perspective extended beyond merely those domestic matters. Jefferson
50

14 JAMES MADISON, A Candid State of the Parties, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
370, 371 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 25
(quoting same and discussing Madison “demonizing his opponents as covert
monarchists”).
51
MADISON, supra note 50, at 371.
52
See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 52-55
(2001) (describing Madison’s Federalist push for the Constitution in the 1780s and his
conversion in the 1790s to Jefferson’s Republican party).
53
Id. at 198.
54
Id. at 140, 198-99.
55
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), in XIV WRITINGS 417,
421 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
56
See ELLIS, supra note 52, at 199.
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drafted a version of what became the Kentucky Resolution that allowed
states to nullify any law not arising under federal jurisdiction set out in the
Constitution.57 Jefferson’s draft further allowed states to secede if
Congress or the federal courts did not adhere to their rejection of the
federal law.58
[19] The Kentucky legislature did not adopt the portions of the Resolution
permitting secession. Madison, always the shrewder political thinker in
the collaboration with Jefferson,59 contemporaneously proposed the
moderate Virginia Resolution, which rejected Jefferson’s “compact”
theory of the Union in favor of judicial review with protections for free
speech and press.60 Although Jefferson disagreed with Madison’s
rejection of nullification and secession, he softened his position to
maintain unity with his chief collaborator against the Federalists.61
[20] Jefferson’s preference for small governments was significant. His
fear of concentrated power also extended to the People. Thus, he
criticized the town meeting style of government used in parts of New
England. Jefferson commented that expansion of that form to other parts
of the Union would permit “the drunken loungers at and about the court
houses” to control political affairs.62 Yet, the People, Jefferson wrote, had
to play an active role in their government.63 He felt citizen involvement
was important to the decentralization of power. Accordingly, Jefferson
proposed concentric levels of government, each drawing from the lower
levels. He suggested a national government limited to defending the
nation and conducting foreign and interstate relations. State governments
would be responsible for civil rights, policing, and administering day-today matters of concern to their citizens. County governments would
attend to local concerns.64 Each layer of government would be responsible
57

Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 200.
59
Id. at 53-54.
60
Id. at 200.
61
Id. at 200-01. Jefferson also, after presenting the idea to Madison, abandoned his
belief that each generation is sovereign and, therefore, laws should expire after
approximately twenty years. Id. at 54-55.
62
JEFFERSON, supra note 55, at 423.
63
See id. at 422.
64
Id. at 421.
58
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for its immediate concerns and would delegate responsibilities for which it
was not competent to a different level.65
[21] To this basic governmental structure, however, Jefferson counseled a
system in which the People would directly impact the government by
controlling it at the lowest, most diffuse level. Thus, he called for
“divid[ing] the counties into wards.”66 Jefferson saw the wards as small
political debating assemblies. These groups would allow each citizen to
educate himself in political matters and “be a sharer in the direction of his
ward-republic . . . [as] a participator in the government of affairs, not
merely at an election one day in the year, but every day.”67 Jefferson
viewed such direct citizen input as essential to the functioning of the
republic, in which the true power comes from the People, and as a
measure for enhancing citizenship.68 Jefferson believed the citizencontrolled wards would commingle with the republican governments at
the county, state, and national levels to form “a gradition [sic] of
authorities, standing each on the basis of law, holding every one of its
delegated share of powers, and constituting truly a system of fundamental
balances and checks for the government.”69
[22] Jefferson, of course, never succeeded in adding citizen wards to
American government. The idea, though, proved hard to shake. The
Progressive Movement of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries
attempted to make Jefferson’s ward system a reality.70 Progressive
activists and political scientists organized public deliberative bodies.71 In
Cleveland, for example, Mayor Tom Johnson held large picnics at which
citizens discussed political matters with the leadership.72 These picnics,
however, led to no large-scale reforms, because Johnson often acted
adversely to public opinion.73
65

Id. at 422.
Id. at 419-20.
67
Id. at 422.
68
ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 47-48 (2004).
69
JEFFERSON, supra note 55, at 422.
70
See LEIB, supra note 68, at 51-52.
71
Id. at 52-56.
72
Id. at 53-54.
73
Id. at 54.
66
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[23] Social debate clubs also opened in, among other places, Rochester,
New York. These clubs allowed all people – even women and immigrants
– to debate politics with professors and other attendees.74 These clubs,
however, were more concerned with helping people become articulate
political debaters than with exerting real political influence, which they
lacked because they were only voluntary organizations which few, if any,
politicians chose to attend.75
[24] The Progressives’ experiments with direct democracy along the
Jeffersonian model failed to make any meaningful change in our political
system. They abandoned their efforts to allow citizens to debate on public
issues. The People, however, never lost their hunger for direct democracy.
C. CALLS FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY
1. THE NATURE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
[25] Americans have actively practiced “direct democracy” for more than
100 years.76 Today, seventy percent of the United States population lives
in a state or city where direct democracy is available.77 As such, a basic
understanding of direct democracy in its modern form, as opposed to the
colonial and Jeffersonian forms, is important in order to understand the
potential changes available due to the Internet.
[26] Direct democracy is a broad label encompassing such decisionmaking processes as town meetings, recall elections, initiatives, and
referenda.78 The most important and most common forms of direct
democracy in the United States are the initiative and referendum.79 Most
74

Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
76
Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old
Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463, 463 (2004).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 465.
79
Id. The initiative and the referendum are both devices that allow the voters to engage
in legislative action without the approval or involvement of their elected officials. The
devices, however, work in different ways. Through an initiative, voters can propose new
legislation. The referendum, in contrast, allows voters to repeal laws already enacted.
See also Jahr v. Casebeer, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing
differences between initiatives and referenda).
75
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Americans favor direct democracy. Studies show people living in direct
democracy markets are happier and more likely to vote, give money to
interest groups, and generally pay more attention to the media and other
sources to enhance their political knowledge.80
[27] Nevertheless, direct democracy is controversial. Like in colonial
times, many journalists and political elites are suspicious of direct
decision-making by citizens.81 These skeptics fear voters are incompetent
to make policy decisions. Further, they argue the process is too subject to
manipulation by special interests and moneyed parties or persons.82
Additionally, many critics claim citizens are incompetent to make political
decisions due to the limited facts they have on which to base their
decisions.83
[28] These weaknesses, however, give voters an incentive to seek
guidance from more informed, credible sources.84 A legislator’s blog
would be ideal. Voters could inform themselves about the issues and
related arguments from materials posted on the blog or located elsewhere
on the Internet. Then, without the need to change to a direct democracy
system of government, the People could directly impact the political
process by communicating their desires to their legislator(s).
2. THE INTERNET LEADS TO CALLS FOR TOTAL DIRECT DEMOCRACY
[29] The high cost of publishing in traditional print and broadcast media
limits the number of voices that can be heard.85 Technology, however, has
led increasingly to the obsolescence of those outlets as the sole arbiters of
the information essential to democracy.86 The change has come because,
contrary to the closed ranks of newspaper publishers, the World Wide
80

Lupia & Matsusaka, supra note 76 at 475 (citing studies).
Id. at 464.
82
Id. These concerns are bolstered by studies demonstrating that strong investments of
money can defeat referenda. Id. at 470-71.
83
Id. at 467.
84
Id. at 469.
85
Joelle Tessler, Web Pundits May Find It’s Not So Free Speech, CQ WEEKLY, Aug. 6,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13638278.
86
Charles Krauthammer, Ross Perot and the Call-in Presidency, TIME, July 13, 1992, at
84.
81
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Web87 is open as a publication forum for anyone with an Internet
connection.88 Thus, “the Internet has brought democracy to your doorstep
and to your desktop.”89 This expansion in the reach of the voices of
average citizens has led to calls from some quarters for changes in how we
conduct our democracy. Pushing the Jeffersonian theme even further,
these advocates seek various forms of direct democracy.
[30] By now, it is well known that “[t]he Internet is an international
network of interconnected computers.”90 The network allows millions of
people to communicate with each other and to access vast caches of
information from around the world.91 This “unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide communication”92 is “the most participatory form
of mass speech yet developed.”93 Because individuals, by using web
pages, can become pamphleteers,94 “the content on the Internet is as
diverse as human thought.”95
[31] The Internet has been described as allowing measurements of public
opinion, providing a public forum, and facilitating citizen access to
government.96 Because of these varied functions, some scholars argue
computers and communications technology spawned a “third industrial

87

When people speak of the Internet, they generally are referring to the World Wide
Web. “The Web” is the part of the Internet on which people use Internet browsers to
view information, pictures, movies, etc. See JOHN LEVINE ET AL., THE INTERNET FOR
DUMMIES 11 (2005). However, the Internet offers several other methods for viewing or
exchanging information. Electronic mail (“e-mail”) is the most used feature of the
Internet. Users can also “chat” with other users by entering online chat rooms or
exchange instant messages with other users through special software. Id. at 261.
Thousands of “newsgroups” are also available where users can post their thoughts and
read other users’ thoughts on topics of interest. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 84951 (1997).
88
Tessler, supra note 85.
89
Id. (quoting online advertising executive Michael Bassik).
90
Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
91
Id. at 850.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 863.
94
Id. at 870.
95
Id. (citation omitted).
96
RICHARD DAVIS, THE WEB OF POLITICS: THE INTERNET’S IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 20-21 (1999).
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revolution.”97 Like the steam power of the first industrial revolution and
the electricity and internal combustion engine of the second industrial
revolution, these scholars believe the technology revolution should forge
changes in government.98
[32] Comparing the Internet to the printing presses that fueled the
revolutionary spirit in the eighteenth century, one writer has proclaimed:
“[T]he founding fathers would have loved the Internet.”99 Because
citizens are the best judges of what is in their best interests, some argue,
they should be allowed to debate and vote directly on important issues.100
Allowing direct participation in government, these critics assert, will
include in policy deliberation the most highly educated and informed
citizens – those who, unlike in the eighteenth century, now generally
reside in business, universities, or the media rather than in Congress.101
[33] Even further, some commentators argue citizens have become so
remote from the decision makers that decisions, though made in their
name, cannot be attributed to them.102 Thus, one writer has argued we
must create a fourth branch of government – the Popular Branch – using
“civil juries” to make laws.103 More mainstream arguments, however,
simply call for direct democracy by electronic town hall meetings.104
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BAR TO A DIRECT DEMOCRACY SYSTEM

[34] Any proposal for a shift to direct democracy faces a major
constitutional impediment. While the Framers might in fact have loved
the Internet as a tool for communications and advocacy, one must doubt
that its existence would have changed their minds about the desirability of
97

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Information Technology and Democratic Governance, in
GOVERNANCE.COM: DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, 1-2 (Elaine Ciulla
Kamarck & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002) [hereinafter “GOVERNANCE.COM”].
98
Id.
99
Vic Sussman, A New Precinct: Cyberspace; Many Activists and Organizers Already
Exploit the Internet; You Can Too, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 19, 1996, at 58.
100
IAN BUDGE, THE NEW CHALLENGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 1-17 (1996).
101
Id. at 74-75.
102
LEIB, supra note 68, at 4.
103
Id.
104
Goldstone, supra note 9, at 341 n.28.
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direct citizen involvement in law making. The Framers drafted the
Constitution to ensure the perpetuation of the balance they struck in which
citizens were involved with some parts of their government but were
removed from its lawmaking aspect.
[35] Article IV § 4 of the Constitution requires that “the United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government.” Consistent with this, Article V requires action by Congress
or by two-thirds of the state legislatures to propose constitutional
amendments and ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures or
conventions. The Framers made no provision for direct control by
citizens.
[36] Nevertheless, Professor Akhil Reed Amar claims we must “unlearn[]”
the purportedly incorrect lesson that the Founders opposed direct
democracy.105 Professor Amar has argued that, because the People are
sovereign, a majority of the People can always exert their sovereign
control over government. Thus, Amar has argued that the People can
amend the Constitution or presumably enact any legislation they desire
simply by majority vote.106
[37] The historical record, however, rejects the argument.107 Nothing in
the language of the Constitution permits direct action by the People either
in legislating or amending the Constitution.108 While “the People” are
involved in the operation of government as voters and through the jury
system, the Constitution does not provide for direct participation by the
People in ordinary lawmaking.109 Thus, Professor Amar gives the
105

AMAR, supra note 42, at 276.
See generally Akil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
107
See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996); Brett W. King, Wild Political
Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, and Supermajority Rules, 2 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 609 (2000) (rejecting Amar’s theory that the People can amend the
Constitution by a majority vote).
108
See Monaghan, supra note 107, at 121-22 (“[T]he Constitution nowhere contemplates
any form of direct, unmediated lawmaking or constitution-making by ‘the People.’”).
109
Id. at 167 n.289 (“[T]he true distinction between these [Greek and other ancient
governments] and the American Governments lies in the total exclusion of the people . . .
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Constitution a “democratic quality” the Framers did not intend for it in
order to avoid the fact that “the Constitution was designed to prevent all
unmediated lawmaking by the people.”110 Professor Amar’s view simply
“cannot be reconciled with the founding generation’s abiding fear of the
excesses of democracy.”111
[38] The historical record amply demonstrates the Founders’ fears of the
passions of the People. The Framers viewed direct citizen participation in
lawmaking as the biggest threat to stable government.112 Indeed, the
Founders likely would have been horrified even by the now accepted
initiative and referendum process.113 Madison and the Federalists he was
then aiding defeated a proposal to add to the First Amendment a right for
the People to “instruct their representatives.”114 They feared disastrous
consequences if lawmakers felt bound to follow the whims of their
constituents.115 The Founders avoided those consequences by drafting a
Constitution that kept the People out of lawmaking and preserved the
structure of government.116
[39] This distrust of the masses was not merely classism. To the contrary,
the Founders’ experience with the colonial form of direct democracy led
them to control majoritarian tendencies. Madison lamented that colonial
governments had too often allowed majorities to ignore the rights of minor
parties.117 This had resulted, he explained, from individuals putting
adherence to political factions over the public good.118

from any share in the [ordinary lawmaking functions].”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
63, 386-87 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
110
Id. at 165.
111
Id. at 139.
112
See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522-26
(1990).
113
Id. at 1523.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
See Monaghan, supra note 107, at 173 n.321 (“The Constitution of 1789 rejected
direct lawmaking by the people, both in enacting ordinary legislation and in changing the
frame of government.”).
117
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 at 55 (James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1888).
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Id.
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[40] Madison warned that, where unchecked by legal means, majorities
often become oppressive.119 He cautioned that such oppression is greatest
in a pure democracy, which:
can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A
common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be
felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and
concert results from the form of government itself; and
there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the
weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that
such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence
and contention; have ever been found incompatible with
personal security or the rights of property; and have in
general been as short in their lives, as they have been
violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have
patronized this species of government, have erroneously
supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in
their political rights, they would, at the same time, be
perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions,
their opinions, and their passions.120
[41] Madison continued that a representative republic “promises the cure
for which we are seeking.”121 The Framers set up a federal republic form
of government to limit the majoritarian passions to which a truly national,
democratic government would be susceptible.122 Madison explained:
[The Constitution is] neither wholly National nor wholly
Federal. Were it wholly National, the supreme and
ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the
People of the Union; and this authority would be competent
at all times, like that of a majority of every National society
to alter or abolish its established Government . . . The mode
provided by the Plan of the Convention is not founded on
either of these principles. In requiring more than a
119

Id. at 60.
Id. at 60-61.
121
Id. at 61.
122
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 at 265 (James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1888).
120
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majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by
States, not by citizens, it departs from the National and
advances toward the Federal character . . .123
[42] The Framers, Madison in particular, gave a great deal of thought to
citizen involvement in government. Their choice to create a republican
government recognized the limitations of citizens as legislators. Many
now argue the Internet has eliminated those limitations.
B. THE CHANGE MADE POSSIBLE BY THE INTERNET

[43] The Internet has certainly alleviated some of the problems the
Founders saw with direct democracy. Madison, for example, pointed out
that a republican government could be maintained over a greater
geographic area than a pure democracy.124 However, the rise of electronic
communications media, and of the Internet in particular, has destroyed the
argument that it is impractical in a mass society to bring citizens together
in a town hall to debate policy matters.125 The ability to bring people
together, though, does not address the Framers’ concern, reflected in the
structure of the Constitution, that the People are too liable to act from
passion and for personal interest without regard for the greater good.126
[44] This article takes no position on the criticisms that direct participation
in government by citizens is a recipe for disaster because citizens are
incapable of preparing themselves for such a role.127 Our Constitution
simply does not allow the types of direct democracy advocated by the
various writers. This bar to the drastic changes sought by those advocates
does not mean, however, that the Constitution bars all methods of
increasing citizen participation in governance.
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Id. (italics in original).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 117, at 53.
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See BUDGE, supra note 100, at 1 & 24.
126
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 117, at 52 (arguing elected
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and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations
. . . [and] will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people
themselves convened for the purpose.”).
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[45] Political participation and voting could be made easier thanks to the
newly cheap and abundant access to information technology.128
Moreover, the costs of participating – both as citizen and legislator – could
be reduced by allowing cheap methods for constituents to contact their
legislators.129 Citizens could exert direct influence over willing legislators
by meeting for online discussions.130 Retaining our representative
democracy, enhanced by direct contact between citizens and legislators,
could maximize participation while avoiding the tyranny of the majority
likely to result from total direct democracy.131 This system, which might
be effected by the legislator’s blog on which this article is based, would
provide citizens a greater say in governance without running afoul of the
Constitution.132
3. THE ADAPTATION OF POLITICS TO THE INTERNET
[46] As the Internet has changed the way society interacts, it has also
changed how politicians campaign and interact with voters. Slowly at
first, the Internet has infused politics. After starting as an after-thought
appealing to small segments of the populace, the Internet has become a
crucial tool in the political arsenal.
[47] The World Wide Web made its political campaign debut in 1992.
The Clinton-Gore campaign initiated use of the Web in presidential
campaigns by posting speeches, position papers, and biographical
information on a website.133 After this simple beginning, calls came
quickly from some quarters to use new technologies to change the nature
of governance.
128

See Nye, supra note 97, at 12.
Id.
130
Arthur Isak Applbaum, Failure in the Cybermarket-place of Ideas, in
GOVERNANCE.COM, supra note 97 at 19-20.
131
See id. at 22-23; see also Dennis Thompson, James Madison on Cyber-Democracy, in
GOVERNANCE.COM, supra note 97 at 35.
132
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majoritarianism problem inherent in pure democracy the Constitution avoids. See supra
text accompanying notes 114-15. This problem, however, seems less likely to arise with
an Internet solicitation for opinions at a legislator’s discretion than with a right of citizens
to “instruct their representatives” enshrined in the Constitution. See id.
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[48] Also in 1992, presidential candidate Ross Perot called for direct
democracy through an “electronic town hall.”134 Perot’s idea was to
present policy issues to the People along with the costs and benefits of
proposals for resolution then let the public comment about the proposals
online. Perot argued this would remove interest groups from politics.135
[49] While his vision obviously has not been fulfilled, some action did
follow Perot’s call for direct democracy through electronic town meetings.
In September 1993, the Public Agenda Foundation held a two-hour
electronic town meeting in San Antonio, Texas using the city’s interactive
cable television system.136 Two Foundation representatives moderated a
panel discussion among eight citizens concerning seven options for cutting
health care costs.137 Also in the 1990s, the Community Service
Foundation formed the Electronic Congress (“EC”).138 The EC let citizens
call a toll-free number to enter their opinions on national issues.139
Additionally, in the mid-1990s, a commercial company known as Vote
Link set up a website providing fora for online public meetings at which
participants can debate public issues.140 Finally, in 1995, residents of
Reading, Pennsylvania used video-conferencing software and cable call-in
shows to debate local and national issues.141
[50] Despite these private sector experiments, neither society nor
politicians in 1992 seemed ready for a marked shift in the nature of
politics or governance. Still, the Internet slowly expanded its importance.
In 1996, for the first time, candidates for office at all levels of government
134

R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, POINT, CLICK, AND VOTE: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNET VOTING 54 (Brookings Institution Press 2004).
135
Id.; see also Krauthammer, supra note 86, at 84 (discussing Perot’s alternative plans to
use television call-in shows to address the public).
136
See Evan I. Schwartz, Direct Democracy: Are You Ready for the Democracy
Channel? (Jan. 1994) available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.01/e.dem_pr.html.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. During the few years of its existence, the EC let participants vote on matters
including United States immigration policy, ending the embargo against Cuba, and
whether Congress should cut Medicare. See The Teledemocracy Action News +
Network, https://fp.auburn.edu/tann/tann2/projecta.html (last visited June 7, 2007).
140
See Vote Link, http://www.votelink.com/ (last visited June 7, 2007).
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See Schwartz, supra note 136.
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had websites to communicate information to citizens.142 Also in 1996,
Lamar Alexander became the first political candidate to engage in an
interactive chat session as part of his campaign.143 Alexander’s foray into
interactivity, however, was the high point for using the Internet’s potential
in campaigning in the 1990s.
[51] Until at least 2000, much of Internet politics was limited to websites
that were “little more than electronic yard signs.”144 During the early era
of Internet campaigning, campaigns simply maintained passive websites
as repositories for biographies, press releases, and other traditional
campaign material.145 Mainstream politicians, while they perhaps saw the
Internet as a means to supplement their campaign, seemed not to see the
potential for truly connecting with citizens electronically. Indeed, a
computer columnist in 1996 noted most contenders for the presidency
refused his request that they participate in a week-long online debate in
which the candidates would take questions from the media, citizens, and
their fellow candidates.146
[52] Despite the scant attention it received from politicians during the
1990s, early online political activists expected the Internet to be “the
dominant political medium by the year 2000.”147 While their timetable for
dominance may have been a bit optimistic, the massive growth in Internet
use during the last few years of the twentieth century began the push in
that direction. In 1997, only eighteen percent of households had an
Internet connection. By 2000, that number had grown to forty-two
percent.148 During this period, “thousands of citizens [became] high-tech
colonial pamphleteers in a planetary public square, using computers and
modems to recruit and organize without leaving their keyboards.”149
142

See DAVIS, supra note 96, at 22-23.
Id. at 87.
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[53] Thanks to increased accessibility, by the 2000 election, presidential
candidates viewed the Internet as an ally. Candidates used the Internet to
raise money, to make announcements, and to post their policy positions,
speeches, and criticisms of their adversaries.150 Also by the 2000 election
cycle, candidates had begun coupling these less-passive websites with
database technology to identify likely voters who might be receptive to
their messages.151 This technology let politicians tailor their messages to
specific voters so they could, through technology, establish a “personal,
one-on-one relationship” with citizens.152
[54] The next step in cultivating a direct relationship with voters online
logically would seem to be personal appearances online. Some politicians
sought to follow Lamar Alexander’s lead by using the Internet to expand
their personal reach. During the 2000 presidential race, Republican
candidate Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr. took part in a town hall meeting by
appearing at the meeting over the Internet.153 John McCain, another
Republican candidate, held an online fundraiser showing a live video feed
of his wife reading questions and him answering the questions.154
Democrat Al Gore and Republican George W. Bush also had an online
debate which received little viewer interest.155
[55] As candidates used the Internet more effectively, other groups did as
well. Activists and protesters used the Internet to spread their messages
and organize their activities.156 These higher levels of online activities
again reflected the increasing use of the Internet in everyday life. By
2003, 54.7 percent of American households had Internet access.157 As a
result, the Internet was ready to play a critical role in political
campaigning.
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[56] In the 2004 election cycle, Democrats used the Internet to fuel their
political machines. Candidate Howard Dean used the Internet to attract
supporters and raise money.158 By the time Dean lost the Democratic
nomination for the presidency, he had compiled an e-mail list of 600,000
people.159 Democratic nominee John Kerry inherited the list, allowing his
campaign to raise more campaign money than the campaign of his
opponent, incumbent President George W. Bush.160 Yet, despite the
fundraising disadvantage, Bush still won because Republicans increased
their turnout at the polls more than the Democrats.161 This surely resulted
at least in part from Bush’s Internet efforts, which included a total e-mail
list of 7.5 million names and 1.4 million volunteers.162
[57] In addition, by 2004, the Internet already had a place on the fringes of
governance. Governments throughout the United States had begun trying
to connect the public to the government through “e-government”
initiatives. These programs allow citizens to e-mail government staff
directly and to access public services online.163 These initiatives are
essential. With Internet usage pervasive in the Nation’s schools, the
coming generation of adults will have no memory of an off-line world.164
[58] Accordingly, while it may have been premature in 1992, many
believe the Internet is now ripe for “deliberative democracy.”165 Former
presidential adviser Dick Morris has argued that “[t]he incredible speed
and interactivity of the Internet will inevitably return our country to a de
facto system of direct democracy by popular referendum. The town158
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meeting style of government will become a national reality.”166 Already
candidates for Congress and governorships have, in a few cases, allowed
for electronic-town-hall style interactions between candidate and citizens.
A few candidates have, for example, invited citizens to post questions to
which the candidate would respond directly and taken part in regularlyscheduled “chats” on their websites.167
[59] With so many developments in the last ten years leading to the
infiltration of the Internet in politics, a policy debate has begun regarding
the wisdom of taking the next step in Internet utilization. Some
commentators argue the principles of democracy are best served by
engaging in direct democracy via the Internet because of the multitude of
background materials available for review online. Others, however, claim
democracy would be disserved by online direct democracy because
citizens would ignore opinions inconsistent with their own.168
Additionally, some assert that lawmakers should not engage in web-based
discussions because the “digital divide” – the fact Web users are
disproportionately white and well-to-do – will result in a skewed view of
their constituents’ opinions.169
[60] Despite the reservations, some observers still describe grass roots
communication with candidates and officials via Internet as a coming
revolution of electronic democracy.170 In light of the massive changes
already effected by the proliferation of Internet use, one can hardly
question that the Internet is a “revolutionary force.”171 As discussed in the
166

DICK MORRIS, VOTE.COM 28 (2001).
See Kamarck, supra note 145, at 97-98.
168
See ALVAREZ & HALL, supra note 134, at 55-56 (contrasting pro-Internet views of
Ross Perot and Dick Morris with concern expressed by Professor Sunstein. See CASS
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 16 (2001)).
169
See David C. King, Catching Voters in the Web, in GOVERNANCE.COM, supra note 97,
at 106; see also LEIB, supra note 68, at 4.
170
See Sussman, supra note 99, at 58.
171
ALVAREZ & HALL, supra note 134, at 2 (noting “the Internet has been touted as a
revolutionary force in American society.”). Seeking a true revolution, a group called
Unity08.com is seeking to change the way presidential candidates are selected. The
group, consisting of former politicians and political aides, hopes to get enough citizens to
nominate a third-party presidential candidate online to get the candidate on the ballot in
all fifty states. The group is planning an online third-party convention in mid-2008
following the early primaries. Any registered voter could be a delegate able to help select
167

24

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 4

next section, new Internet technology has simplified direct communication
between groups of people and the formation of online communities to the
extent that politicians could readily interact with their constituents. In
order to allow online citizen participation in a representative democracy,
however, the legislator would have to open the forum to all interested
citizens.172 For the reasons set out in Section III, detailing the applicable
First Amendment constraints, the risk of opening such a forum would
carry too much political risk for legislators.
A. THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF BLOGS ENTERS SOCIETY

[61] Communication over the Internet has always been relatively easy.
Recently, however, engaging in true personal conversations has become as
easy as posting materials to a website. This generally occurs via web logs,
also known as “blogs.”173
[62] Blogs are usually written and maintained by individuals or small
groups known as “bloggers.”174 Their content, however, is accessible to
anyone with an Internet connection.175 Blogs are online diaries or journals
discussing a variety of topics.176 Both the nature and prevalence of blogs
have changed dramatically in the past decade.

the candidate. The group believes this will let the People, instead of a narrow segment of
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[63] Only a handful of blogs existed in 1997 and 1998.177 At that time,
only people well versed in HTML178 and with the free time to build and
maintain a site requiring daily updates had blogs.179 Early blogs were
organized around links to other sites.180 Bloggers acted as human filters
for the Internet by providing links, coupled with their own commentary, to
people, information, or sites they found interesting.181 While not always
sophisticated, these sites marked the beginning of a movement to include
the public in the media, letting individuals praise, criticize, or correct
content posted on other sites or blogs.182
[64] The style of blogs soon began to change, however. Beginning in
1999, software developers began releasing various do-it-yourself tools for
building blogs.183 Thus, blogs are now easy to set up and require no
knowledge of computer programming.184 While the link-driven-style
blogs still exist, most new bloggers use their blogs as online personal
journals instead of guides to the content of the web.185 Bloggers record
their personal thoughts and relate important events on their blogs for all
the world to see.186 This style of blogging soon led to full-blown
conversations between blogs in which one blogger would respond to
postings on another blog while providing a link to the responded-to
blog.187

177

See Rebecca Blood, Weblogs: A History and Perspective,
http://www.rebeccablood.net/essays/
weblog_history.html (last modified Sept. 7, 2000).
178
HTML is the acronym for Hypertext Markup Language, which is the computer
language used to design web pages. HTML allows the web page author to structure the
information on and, to some extent, the appearance of a web page. See LEVINE, supra
note 87, at 296.
179
See Blood, supra note 177.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
See Peterson, supra note 175, at 8.
185
See Blood, supra note 177.
186
Id.
187
Id.

26

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 4

[65] Thus, modern bloggers are primarily concerned with posting their
thoughts on specific topics.188 The postings are then organized in
chronological order, making each blog a sort of archived opinion page.189
Blogs also allow readers to post responses or comments.190 The ability for
readers to leave comments about materials on a blog fosters a dialogue
between bloggers.191 Instead of posting static information, the comment
feature makes blogs interactive as readers respond to the initial comment
posted on the blog and then to each other’s responses.192
[66] These unique features have resulted in mammoth growth in blogging.
In a January 2005 report, the Pew Internet & American Life Project
reported that seven percent of the 120 million Internet users in the United
States had created a blog. That amounts to more than eight million
bloggers.193 One report had the number of bloggers reaching eleven
million by August 2005.194 Further, by the end of 2004, twenty-seven
percent of Internet users, or thirty-two million Americans, reported
reading blogs.195 This marked a seventeen percent increase over those
admitting blog readership in February of that year.196 This increase was
likely traceable to coverage of the 2004 presidential election. Nine
percent of Internet users said they “frequently” or “sometimes” read
political blogs during the campaign.197 Additionally, twelve percent of
Internet users have posted comments or other material on a blog.198
188
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[67] The ease and speed of blogging distinguishes it from other modes of
speech. Posting material immediately makes it available to all the world’s
Internet users.199 As a result, “blogs are an emerging form of legitimate
and widespread communication of both fact and opinion . . . .”200 Blogs
democratize journalism by letting the People speak. This results in
dissemination of expert opinions the public otherwise would not hear.201
For example, the “Baghdad Blogger,” Salam Pax, maintained an online
diary of life in wartime Iraq.202 Professor Juan Cole’s blog provides
scholarly discussion of Shiite Arabs and how Sunni Arabs are using the
current American military presence in Iraq as a major recruiting tool.203
[68] Business has even begun to recognize the value of apparently honest,
unpolished communications. Though still relatively rare, some major
corporations have created blogs for use by both employees and
customers.204 These companies, slowly and often hesitantly, have
recognized the value of blogs as a marketing tool.205 Companies such as
Sun Microsystems, Inc. and Google have encouraged employees to blog
on a corporate site.206 These companies see their blogs as a way to
enhance communication with customers and to build a type of
community.207 Companies may also use blogs to facilitate communication
between management and employees.208
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[69] Software giant Microsoft successfully used blogs to restore its image
in the wake of the United States’ antitrust suit against the company.209
Beginning in 2001, Microsoft encouraged employees to blog about the
company and its products.210 The employees’ passionate musings added
an authentic voice that put a human face on the giant company.211 The
program was so successful that, between 2001 and 2005, Microsoft’s
blogging corps grew to more than 1,200 bloggers.212
[70] Blogs are unlike traditional websites in the corporate or political
realm. Not just information conduits, blogs reflect the personalities of
their individual authors.213 Because of this, though, all is not roses in the
blogging world. Bloggers view blogs as a place to vent and to speak
frankly. “[T]he ethos of the blogosphere is to be chatty and sometimes
catty and crude.”214 The unrestricted nature of blog postings has proven
problematic in the business world, with several known instances – readily
discussed on various blogs – of employees being fired for blog postings
critical of their employer or co-workers.215 Google, for example, has
disciplined an employee for “improper” postings.216
[71] Accordingly, blogs may be just as harmful as they may be helpful.
“At their best, blogs provide a civil, usually lucid, and running debate
about subjects of public interest and concern. At their worst, blogs are
potentially defamatory, profane, and rife with rumor and misstatements of
fact.”217 One with knowledge of the content in a blog posting potentially

209

See Rubel, supra note 188.
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Joyce, supra note 205, at A01 (quoting interview with Lee Rainie, director of the Pew
Internet & American Life Project).
215
See id. at A01; see also Charles Duhigg, World Wide Water Cooler: Can You Be Fired
for Complaining About Your Boss Online?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 8,
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April2004/scene_duhigg_marapr04.msp.
216
Joyce, supra note 205, at A01.
217
Peterson, supra note 175, at 8.
210

29

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 4

could be liable for discrimination, harassment, or defamation of others.218
While this risk can be minimized in the employment setting with a
blogging policy,219 a legislator faces special constraints in applying an
equivalent blog-posting policy.220
[72] Nevertheless, politicians cannot ignore blogs. Blogs have gained
favor because they combine the tone of a personal conversation with the
accessibility of a website.221 Blogs are attractive and powerful, no matter
what the topic, because of their authenticity.222 They are authored by
individuals with a passion for the topics discussed and, by using feedback
to create a dialogue, they create an ongoing, honest conversation.223
Creating or contributing to a blog allows citizens not only to join in the
public debate, but also to make a meaningful contribution by fostering
critical thinking skills essential to an informed electorate.224
I. BLOGS ENTER POLITICS

[73] Lawrence Lessig has described blogging as “one of the most
important opportunities” citizens have to create an alternative to existing
media.225 No longer just using campaign bulletin boards, volunteers and
activists have begun spreading their own perspectives on blogs. The
power of blogs already showed itself in the 2004 election cycle as
Republican bloggers took on the “mainstream media” and won. On
September 8, 2004, CBS’s Dan Rather reported on documents allegedly
showing President Bush had been absent during much of his National
Guard service in the early 1970s. When CBS posted the documents,
allegedly created in 1972, on its website, Republican bloggers
218

See Swaya & Eisenstein, supra note 173, at 5; see, e.g., Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines,
Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. 2000) (ruling an airline could be held liable for a pilot
describing a female pilot as a “feminazi” on the employer’s electronic bulletin board).
219
See Swaya & Eisenstein, supra note 173, at 5.
220
See infra Parts III.B.2-3.
221
See Tessler, supra note 85 (quoting interview with Michael Cornfield of the Pew
Internet & American Life Project).
222
See Rubel, supra note 188.
223
Id.
224
See Julie China, Blogger’s Anonymous, FEDERAL LAWYER, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 6.
225
See Eric Hellweg, Lawrence Lessig Talks Copyright and the Supreme Court, South by
Southwest, http://www.sxsw.com/interactive/tech_report/recent_interviews/l_lessig/ (last
visited May 22, 2006).
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immediately challenged them as modern forgeries.226 After eleven days of
defending the documents, the evidence of forgery became overwhelming,
leading CBS to admit an error in airing the story and to Rather’s
resignation as news anchor.227
[74] Republicans have not, however, been alone in taking advantage of the
power of blogs. In 2005, Democratic bloggers railed against comments by
Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott praising Strom Thurmond’s
1948 segregationalist presidential campaign.228
True to Lessig’s
prediction, the bloggers’ efforts forced the mainstream media to give the
story more attention and ultimately led to Lott’s resignation of his
leadership post.229
[75] Thus, speech on blogs already has become a tool for influencing
political tides – “the modern equivalent of political pamphleteering.”230
Having already gained influence and demonstrated successes, blogs took
another leap toward mainstream credibility in 2004 when the Democratic
National Committee let some political bloggers, many with no journalistic
training, attend and blog about its convention.231 Finally, on November
18, 2005, the Federal Election Commission stated in an advisory opinion
that blogs operated by Fired Up! LLC were “the online equivalent of a
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication.”232 The blogs were,
therefore, exempt from campaign finance limits and regulation pursuant to
the statutory press exception.233
[76] Blogs have become powerful tools in many sectors of society,
including politics and the shaping of public opinion. They allow people to

226

See Barone, supra note 158, at 42; see also Tessler, supra note 85 (noting bloggers
first expressed doubts regarding the authenticity of the documents); Rubel, supra note
188 (same).
227
See Barone, supra note 158, at 42.
228
See Tessler, supra note 85.
229
Id.
230
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005).
231
Rubel, supra note 188.
232
Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2005-16 at 5, available at
http://www.fec.gov/aos/2005/ao2005-16final.pdf.
233
Id. at 4.
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create a close-knit community from remote locations.234 This tool, then,
seems tailor made for politicians – either because they genuinely want to
interact with and hear the opinions of their constituents or because they
want to give the appearance that they are interested in what their
constituents have to say. The upside for a legislator blogging with
constituents seems great. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the downside is
probably greater.
III. WHY POLITICIANS SHOULD FEAR BLOGGING WITH CONSTITUENTS
[77] The chance for full and frank discussion between legislator and
constituent is a benefit of interactive communication via the Internet. One
study concluded conversations occurring over a network resulted in all
participants having a roughly equal say in the discussion, unlike many inperson meetings that are dominated by one or two people.235 The same
study also found people typically reluctant to speak in personal meetings
were more comfortable speaking in a networked setting.236
[78] The problem with interactivity, though, is lack of control over the
respondent. This may manifest itself in many ways. Most obviously is
the potential lack of control over who chooses to join the conversation. A
survey of candidates for office in 1996 showed those with websites
allowing users to e-mail the candidate received many messages from nonconstituents.237 Candidates do not want to spend their time with
anonymous citizens who may not be able to vote for them.238 This
problem, however, can be resolved with relatively little trouble.239
234

In probably the most powerful show of the Internet’s power as a political tool to date,
a soldier serving in the war in Iraq won a seat on the city council of Grand Forks, North
Dakota. With support from family members who handed out fliers, held a campaign
rally, and put up signs around the town, the soldier appealed directly to voters by
answering questions via e-mail. See Internet Campaign From Iraq Wins Dakota
Election, CNN.COM, June 15, 2006, available at
http://www.smartmobs.com/archive/2006/06/19/elected_to_the_.html.
235
See Lee Sproull & Sara Kiesler, Computers, Networks, and Work, 265 SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN 3, Sept. 1991, at 116, 119.
236
Id. at 120.
237
See DAVIS, supra note 96, at 91.
238
See Kamarck, supra note 145, at 98.
239
This form of direct connection between legislator and constituent is core political
speech. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-588 (1980)
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[79] More important from the legislator’s perspective is the loss of control
over his or her message. While the Internet has many attributes, it also has
a “dark side,” in that people can publish what they want on the Internet
without fact checking.240 They are able to “post commentary, news, rumor
and ruminations online . . . .”241 In order to attract attention in a diffuse
and saturated media world, bloggers often seek attention by posting
inflammatory or scurrilous matters without concern for fact checking.242
People also tend to express more extreme opinions over the Internet than
in personal conversations.243
[80] It is true that “[b]logging empowers average citizens to be able to
speak to mass audiences” even if they cannot “afford a printing press or a
radio station.”244 Such great reach means that, unless the forum were
tightly censored, participants could write anything and leave it on the
(Brennan, J., concurring). See also id. at 575 (plurality opinion) (the “expressly
guaranteed freedoms” of the First Amendment “share a common core purpose of assuring
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government”). In
order to make such communication feasible, however, the legislator would have to
apportion time and/or access equitably. See BUDGE, supra note 100, at 115 (stating
efficiency in a direct democracy would require government to apportion time equitably).
The legislator would need, for example, to ensure she does not spend all her time
responding to messages from non-constituents to the exclusion of those whose opinions
should shape her actions. Similarly, the legislator would have to ensure her server space
was not consumed by non-constituent postings to the exclusion of constituent
communications. To maintain the viability of the communication method, the First
Amendment would permit a time, place, or manner restriction on those who could use the
blog. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions on speech are permitted so long as they “are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and . . . they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information”) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). One might imagine many permissible
technological solutions to these problems. Most obviously, the First Amendment should
permit the legislator to require constituents to register for the site by providing a name
and address, which could be checked either manually or electronically against the voter
registry. Similarly, the server could be programmed to delete all messages after they had
been posted for a pre-determined, reasonable period of time.
240
See Sussman, supra note 99, at 62.
241
Tessler, supra note 85.
242
See Zuckerman, supra note 201, at 76.
243
See Sproull & Kiesler, supra note 235, at 120-21.
244
Tessler, supra note 85.
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legislator’s blog for all others to see.245 In the context of the modern
debate over how to deal with illegal immigrants from Mexico, many
legislators would be unwilling to have posted on their blogs a statement
such as “send the dirty Mexicans back home.”246 As demonstrated in the
remainder of this article, however, the First Amendment would not permit
a legislator to censor his or her blog.
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
[81] Of course, the right to engage in political speech is the central
component of the First Amendment’s speech clause.247 The First
Amendment demonstrates our “‘profound national commitment’ to the
principle that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open . . . .’”248 The Supreme Court has developed the public forum
doctrine to further this commitment by permitting free speech at times and
locations at which the speech is likely to be meaningful.249 The doctrine
also provides “a metaphorical reference point” for protecting speech in all
locations.250
[82] By granting a right to speak on public property, the government has
ensured all speakers have a forum for distributing their messages.251
Further, the government subsidizes speech in these fora by not enforcing
trespass or theft laws against those who use the fora for speech without
paying for upkeep, security, etc.252 Thus, the public forum doctrine acts as
245

Kamarck, supra note 145, at 98.
This is, of course, a very mild form of racial attack. The author will leave to the
reader’s imagination the types of statements people might post regarding immigration or
any other controversial issue.
247
See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 597 (1998).
248
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
249
Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum – From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1535 (1998).
250
Id.
251
See Noah D. Zatz, Note, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums
in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 161-62 (Fall 1998).
252
Id. at 161-62 & 164 (noting taxpayers must bear costs of cleaning up litter from
leafleters and providing police protection to unpopular speakers while members of the
public must endure increased congestion, uninvited solicitation, and expression of
repugnant views as they use the public property).
246
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a “First Amendment easement”253 ensuring access regardless of the
preferences of the government owners or the private users of the
property.254
[83] Yet, government is not required to permit all forms of speech on its
property. Where the government acts as manager over its internal
operations instead of as a lawmaker with regulatory power, its acts are not
subject to heightened review.255 This approach is reflected in the Court’s
“forum based” approach to reviewing speech restrictions on government
property.256
[84] The Supreme Court first referred to a public forum analysis in 1939.
It said then that citizens had speech rights on streets and in parks because
those locations had “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”257 As discussed below, this remains the heart of the public
forum doctrine.
[85] As Professor Gey has pointed out, the Hague case is a weak
foundation for a free speech doctrine. The famous language giving rise to
the public forum doctrine is merely dicta in a plurality opinion.258
Moreover, the Hague plurality did not refute the prevailing view,
expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes as a state judge,259 that government

253

Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 13.
254
See Zatz, supra note 251, at 172.
255
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
256
Id.
257
Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
Although Hague only identified streets and parks as having been held immemorially in
trust for the public, the Supreme Court, citing Hague, has recognized sidewalks as a third
type of traditional public forum property. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)
(citing Hague, 307 U.S. at 515).
258
Gey, supra note 249, at 1539.
259
See Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895).
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had the right to control its property to the same extent as private property
owners.260
[86] The Court, however, soon removed any confusion by expressly
adopting the Hague dicta and rejecting the early Holmes view.261 The
Court then slowly narrowed the scope of the public forum doctrine by
focusing on the three specific types of property identified in Hague and
carving out exceptions even for those “traditional” public fora.262 Forty
years after creating the public forum concept in Hague, the Court set the
restrictive modern public forum analysis.263
[87] In this analytical framework, the extent to which the First
Amendment allows a government to restrict speech on the government’s
own property depends on the character of the forum.264 The Supreme
Court has identified three categories of analysis for public forum purposes.
First are those places that, by tradition or government declaration, have
been devoted to assembly and debate.265
1. TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORA
[88] The classic description of the traditional public forum remains
Hague’s reference to streets, sidewalks, and parks immemorially held in
trust for the public.266 The Supreme Court, however, has provided some
260

See Gey, supra note 249, at 1539-40 (citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana:
Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 238 and Kalven, supra note 253, at
13).
261
See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1943); see also Gey, supra note 249, at
1540 & n.24 (discussing Jamison).
262
See Gey, supra note 249, at 1542-47. For example, several courts have ruled that
sidewalks were non-public fora under varying circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (sidewalk that runs only from Post Office entrance to
parking lot); Jacobsen v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 04-3716, 2006 WL 1312184, at * 1 (8th
Cir. May 15, 2006) (explaining that perimeter sidewalks at Iowa highway rest stops are
non-public fora); Jacobsen v. Bonine, 123 F.3d 1272, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1997) (same for
Arizona rest stop sidewalks); Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189,
1203 (11th Cir. 1991) (same for Florida rest stop sidewalks).
263
See Gey, supra note 249, at 1547.
264
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-800 (1985)
(“Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.”).
265
Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
266
See Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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additional contour to its description. The traditional public forum is
property that has as “a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of
ideas.”267 Such property is “continually open, often uncongested, and
constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality’s
citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the open air or the
company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment.”268
[89] Thus, a traditional public forum is one with “the physical
characteristics of a public thoroughfare, . . . the objective use and purpose
of open public access or some other objective use and purpose inherently
compatible with expressive conduct, [and] historical[ly] and traditional[ly]
has been used for expressive conduct . . .”269 All such fora share a
common trait in that open access and viewpoint neutrality are “compatible
with the intended purposes of the property.”270 The requirements of
openness and neutrality mean content-based restrictions in these fora are
subject to strict scrutiny.271
2. DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORA
[90] Of course, the First Amendment is not absolute. “The Constitution
does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly
of the whole.”272 Nor does the First Amendment mean “that people who
want to (voice) their views have a constitutional right to do so whenever
and however and wherever they please.”273 Thus, government bodies may
meet in executive session without public access.274
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Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981).
269
Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 1999).
270
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1988).
271
Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (explaining
that speech on government property “that has traditionally been available for public
expression” faces strict scrutiny).
272
City of Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167,
179 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)).
273
Id. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48
(1966)).
274
Id.
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[91] The First Amendment requires a different result, however, where a
governmental body has chosen to open its decision-making processes to
public participation.275 Its action creates “a public forum dedicated to the
expression of views by the general public.”276 Thus, the second category
recognized by the public forum doctrine consists of public property
opened by the government for expressive activity by the public.277
[92] Aside from the traditional public forum, the government must act
intentionally to create a public forum.278 To do so, the government must
“intentionally open[] a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”279
Governmental inaction does not create a public forum.280 The location of
the property is also relevant to determining its status. A property’s
separation from acknowledged public forum property may demonstrate
that it is separate from and more restricted than the public forum
property.281
[93] The key in determining whether government property that is not a
traditional public forum has been designated as a public forum is how the
property is used.282 The government’s intent in constructing the space and
its need to control expressive activity are also relevant. These factors can
be isolated by looking to policies or regulations regarding the forum.283
Similarly, the government can demonstrate it did not intend to create a
forum for speech by pointing to litigation in which it sought to limit
speech in the alleged forum.284
[94] The Court gave some guidance in applying these principles to
determine when the government will be held to have established a
designated public forum. Where the government allows occasional but
275

Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 179.
277
See Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
278
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1992).
279
Id. at 680 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985)).
280
Lee, 505 U.S. at 680.
281
Id.
282
See Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of New York Dep’t of
Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002).
283
See id. at 547; see also Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 974-75 (8th Cir. 2006).
284
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992).
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only limited use of a property that is otherwise specifically reserved for its
employees, it does not create a public forum. Thus, a school’s internal
mail system, used for transmitting official messages between teachers and
administration, exchange of personal messages among teachers, and
occasionally for transmission of messages from civic organizations,285 was
not a public forum.286 Similarly, no public forum exists where the
property serves a commercial function and must remain attractive to the
marketplace. A property’s commercial nature suggests the property’s
purpose is something other than “promoting ‘the free exchange of
ideas.’”287 As such, an airport terminal is not a public forum.288
[95] When the government opens a designated public forum, however, it is
stuck with the consequences of its action.289 Restrictions on speech in
designated public fora are treated with the same skepticism as restrictions
in traditional public fora.290 Although the government was not required to
open the forum and can close a designated public forum,291 restrictions
imposed in a designated public forum are subject to strict scrutiny so long
as the government leaves the forum open for expression.292
A. LIMITED PUBLIC FORA

[96] Nonetheless, because the designated public forum is a creature of
government action, the government can exercise more control over the
forum by setting limits when it creates the forum. Perry recognized, in
addition to the designated public forum, the limited public forum.293
285

See Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983).
Id. at 46.
287
Lee, 505 U.S. at 682 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
288
Lee, 505 U.S. at 682.
289
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(explaining that, after the government opens a forum, it “must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set.”).
290
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 678.
291
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
292
Id.
293
Id. at 46 n.7. Some confusion exists in the circuit courts regarding the limited public
forum category. Some circuits treat the terms designated public forum and limited public
forum as synonymous while others regard the limited public forum as a sub-category of a
designated public forum where the designated forum is open only to certain speakers or
286
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When the government opens a limited public forum, it limits the forum to
communications by certain groups294 or addressing certain subjects.295
[97] As with a designated public forum, the government must
affirmatively open a limited public forum.296 When it does so, it may
choose the types of speakers and/or subjects that will be permitted in the
forum.297 The government, however, does not create a limited public
forum when it grants “selective access for individual speakers rather than
general access for a class of speakers.”298
[98] Still, although a state is not required to permit all manners of speech
or speakers when it opens a limited public forum,299 the government’s
authority in this forum is not boundless. The government may not
discriminate based on viewpoint, and any restrictions imposed “must be
‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’”300 Thus, the
government may not selectively deny access for speech or activities of the
genre for which it opened the forum.301 The government may, however,
exclude expression beyond the genre for which it opened the limited
public forum so long as its actions are viewpoint neutral and reasonable.302

for certain subjects. See Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975-76 (8th Cir. 2006)
(collecting cases and describing split). The distinction is significant because
governmental restrictions on speech of a type not allowed in a limited public forum must
only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Id. at 976.
294
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citing generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981)).
295
See id. (citing generally City of Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)).
296
See Hotel Emples. & Rest. Emples. Union v. City of New York Dep’t of Parks &
Rec., 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002).
297
Id.
298
Ark. Educ. TV Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998).
299
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
300
Id. at 106-07 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985)). See also infra discussion of reasonableness in the following section on nonpublic fora.
301
See Hotel Emples.& Rest. Emples., 311 F.3d at 545-46.
302
Id. at 546.
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3. NON-PUBLIC FORA
[99] The last category encompasses government property that is neither by
tradition nor by designation a public forum.303 When determining whether
a property is a non-public forum, “[t]he crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of
a particular place at a particular time.”304 “When government property is
not dedicated to open communication[,] the government may – without
further justification – restrict use to those who participate in the forum’s
official business.”305
[100] The government’s power as property owner is at its zenith in this
class of property. Government may preserve the intended purposes of the
forum – whether communicative or not – so long as its regulations on
speech are reasonable and not an effort to suppress a speaker’s
viewpoint.306 The government’s actions “can be based on subject matter
and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”307
Further, its actions need only be reasonable. The government’s chosen
restrictions do not have to “be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation.”308
[101] The reasonableness of the restrictions imposed in a non-public
forum are viewed “in the light of the purpose of the forum and all
surrounding circumstances,”309 and must be “consistent with the
[government’s] legitimate interest in preserving the property for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated.”310 A speech restriction in a non-public
303

See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
305
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 53.
306
See id. at 46.
307
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
308
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (quoting
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730).
309
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985).
310
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51. The same
analysis applies to exclusions from limited public fora based on a speaker’s alleged
noncompliance with the limitations on expression in the forum. See supra text
accompanying note 300.
304
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forum, therefore, is “reasonable” when it is “consistent with the
[government’s] legitimate interest in preserving the property . . . for the
use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”311
4. IMPACT OF THE MODERN PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS
[102] The public forum doctrine protects access to those locations most
important to fulfill the goal of the First Amendment.312 The protection of
speech on certain government property reinforces “the idea that we are a
free people” by giving citizens notice that they may exercise their
freedoms on such property without fear of government censorship.313
Because government authority to limit speech in this realm is premised on
the government’s ownership of the property, the public forum doctrine
furthers our concept of limited government by focusing on the physical
characteristics of the property to curtail regulation where the property is
appropriate for speech.314
[103] The tri-partite public forum analysis is protective of speech in
traditional public fora and designated public fora. However, these classes
are quite narrow. Because the government must declare a designated (or
limited) public forum and it is able to set the parameters of its designation,
the designated public forum category “provides little, if any, additional
protection to speech.”315 Moreover, in a nonpublic forum, the analysis
revives the pre-Hague property owner analysis allowing the government
to exclude speakers so long as they are not excluded on the basis of
viewpoint.316 The sharp limitation on access to non-public fora is also
significant given the Court’s focus on governmental intent as to how a
forum should be used. This analysis has two sides. First, a forum is only
converted from non-public forum to public forum if the government so
311

Id. (quoting Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assn’s, 453 U.S. 114, 12930 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
312
See Zatz, supra note 251, at 160-61.
313
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
314
Id.
315
Id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Gey, supra note 249, at 1569-71
(criticizing Justice Kennedy’s approach to public forum analysis for continuing to
recognize the designated public forum category).
316
See Gey, supra note 249, at 1547-48.
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intends.317 Second, even if the government allows conversion to a public
forum, the government is able to limit the forum to the type of speech it
prefers.318
[104] As we set about to classify our legislator’s blog in the next section,
we will see the legislator both protected and undermined by these First
Amendment principles. Ultimately, the burden of First Amendment
protections for speakers on the blog will likely prove too great for the
legislator to tolerate.
B. BLOGS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
[105] Because the Internet is still quite new, the courts have given only
limited guidance in how to apply traditional legal rules in the electronic
setting.319 In fact, some scholars assert current First Amendment analysis,
and the history- and tradition-based public forum doctrine in particular,
are unworkable in this new age of technology.320 Such arguments are
misguided.
[106] No reason exists for treating the Internet differently than the off-line
world in analyzing speech rights. Speech serves the same purpose
whether it is shouted across a park or streamed (or typed) over the
Internet. The Supreme Court has even recognized that “the same
principles are applicable” to fora existing “more in a metaphysical than in
a spatial or geographic sense.”321 In fact, the Court has already, in Reno v.
ACLU,322 applied a typical First Amendment analysis in the Internet
context.323

317

See id. at 1548.
Id.
319
Nat’l A-1 Adver., Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F.Supp.2d 156, 167 (D.N.H.
2000) (“Because of the relative novelty of the Internet, there is very little precedent
applying traditional or familiar legal principles to its operation.”).
320
See, e.g., John J. Brogan, Speak & Space: How the Internet Is Going to Kill the First
Amendment As We Know It, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, at * 3 (Summer 2003).
321
Rosenberger v. Rector Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
322
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
323
See David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Cyber Forum:
Public vs. Private In Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 9 (Winter 1998).
318
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[107] As in any case, the first step in evaluating speech restrictions on
government property is to determine the type of forum – traditional public
forum, designated public forum, or non-public forum – involved.324
Under the Perry analysis, classification is key. Because the government
almost always wins fights over access to non-public fora, the war is
usually won on the classification battlefield.325
[108] When considering the proper classification for First Amendment
purposes, one must first identify the proper venue to be classified. In the
offline world, some government properties, like a university campus, may
consist of multiple types of fora.326 Some parts of a campus, like
classrooms and administrative offices, are non-public fora. Other parts,
like auditoriums, may be open to certain speech on certain topics, making
them designated (or perhaps limited) public fora. Finally, the campus is
likely surrounded by and perhaps even traversed by public streets and
sidewalks, which are traditional public fora.327
[109] The Internet should be viewed as a similarly dynamic entity with
some parts that are public fora and some parts that are non-public fora.328
Because of its open architecture, the Internet clearly has areas that are
public fora. This does not mean, however, that every site on the Net is a
public forum. The question in any case is whether the one specific site
with which we are concerned is a public forum.329
1. THE LEGISLATOR’S BLOG IS A PUBLIC FORUM
[110] If the courts have had little time to contemplate application of
traditional principles to the Internet as a whole, they have had virtually no
324

See, e.g., Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 974-75 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United
States v. Kokinda , 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) (explaining that in considering a speech
restriction, one must consider the significance of the government interest in light of the
nature and function of the forum at issue).
325
See Gey, supra note 249, at 1548.
326
See Bowman, 444 F.3d at 974-75.
327
Id. at 977.
328
See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 337 (arguing the Internet should be viewed as a city).
329
See id. at note 323, at 10 (Because the Internet is composed of parts marked by
varying degrees of public access, “the important question will not be ‘Whether
cyberspace is a public forum,’ but ‘Where are the public forums in cyberspace?’”).
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occasion to consider applying legal doctrines to blogs.330 The one court to
consider the matter held postings on a blog are entitled to First
Amendment protection.331 The conclusion that the First Amendment can
apply to blogs, however, far from resolves the inquiry. We must
determine whether a legislator’s blog, in particular, is subject to the First
Amendment and, if so, to what level of First Amendment protection blog
postings are entitled.
A. THE LEGISLATOR, AS A STATE ACTOR, MUST COMPLY WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

[111] It is axiomatic that the First Amendment only restricts government
conduct.332 The structure of the Internet, however, is primarily owned and
operated by private companies.333 Communications over private networks
like that owned by America Online may face state action bars.334 This
problem is overcome, however, where the government supplies or
subsidizes the network.335
330

See Peterson, supra note 175, at 8 (noting, given the recent rise of blogs, courts have
not dealt with how to apply traditional legal rules).
331
See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005).
332
See, e.g., Public Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952).
333
See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 350.
334
See id. at 350-51.
335
Id. at 348. One could conceive of a legislator trying to avoid the First Amendment
pitfalls detailed in this article by using his private Internet account to host the blog on
which he solicits constituent opinions. While an exhaustive discussion of the
implications of such an act is beyond the scope of this paper, the private actor barrier
likely would not protect the legislator in that instance. A private actor is deemed to be a
state actor when it has a “symbiotic relationship” with the state. See Perkins v.
Londonberry Basketball Club, 196 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1999). The symbiotic test is
satisfied where the government is so intertwined with the actor as to be a joint participant
with him. Id. at 21. A politician using his personal blog to solicit opinions from
constituents to guide his official actions seems to be acting in conjunction with the
government. Moreover, even if a politician could be considered a private person under
such circumstances, “state action may be found if . . . there is such a close nexus between
the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated
as that of the State itself.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531
U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even an unequivocally private
actor like an Internet service provider would be subject to the First Amendment if it
undertook clearly governmental functions, such as hosting an election. See Goldstone,
supra note 323 at 21-22. The politician as private person soliciting political opinions he
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[112] Most obviously, when the government supplies the network, no state
action problem exists. When the legislator is sued for violating the First
Amendment by, for example, censoring the blog hosted on a governmentowned network server, the actor being challenged is unquestionably a
government agent.336
[113] The same result is obtained even if the government only subsidizes
the network. In the Internet context, no state action concerns arise where a
governmental entity acts as a censor337 because the government action
element is met where the discussion originates from a government-owned
computer.338 State action simply is not a problem when the government is
alleged to have committed the challenged action since the Constitution,
Bill of Rights, and Amendments restrict governmental actions.339
Maintenance of her blog on a government server for purposes of assisting
her in performing her official duties indicates the legislator is acting in her
governmental capacity, thus satisfying the state action test.340 Therefore, a
politician attempting to censor a public forum meets the state action
requirement.341

intends to use in his official acts seems to be acting in a way so closely related to his
governmental function as to be considered a part of his state action.
336
See cf. Goldstone, supra note 9, at 354-57 (arguing the state action doctrine bars
application of the First Amendment to private network operators).
337
See, e.g., Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997) (no discussion of state
action as an issue where professor at a state university sued the university for blocking
access to Internet newsgroups).
338
See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 385.
339
See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 16.1 (3d ed. 1999).
340
See, e.g., Minshew v. Smith, 380 F. Supp. 918, 922 (W.D. Miss. 1974) (elected
representative acting in his or her official capacity is a state actor); Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151 (1970) (involvement of a sheriff, a state actor, in
unconstitutional conduct meets the state action test); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 364
(1987) (legislator is a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 494 (2d ed. 2002)
(state action exists when the actor undertaking the challenged act is a government
employee acting as a government officer).
341
See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 9, at 379-80 (stating state action exists where
hypothetical president attempts to silence a hypothetical conference).
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B. CLASSIFYING THE LEGISLATOR’S BLOG

[114] Having determined that the legislator’s blog is subject to First
Amendment strictures, the next issue is the nature of the applicable
limitations. Because the Perry forum-based analysis provides different
levels of protection depending on the type of forum at issue, we must
determine into which category the legislator’s blog fits. As demonstrated
above, the public forum analysis is a two-step inquiry. First, does a long
tradition of public debate exist on the property? If not, has the
government opened the property as a place for expression?342
[115] The public forum doctrine’s focus on the pedigree of property in
deciding whether speech protection attaches leaves many unanswered
questions. Most crucial for a blog – or any speech on the Internet – is
whether any particular duration of existence for a particular forum can
meet the requirements of a traditional public forum.343 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court seems to have barred the recognition of new traditional
public fora and limited the category to parks, streets, and sidewalks.344
[116] In Lee, the Court rejected calls to recognize airport terminals as
traditional public fora. The majority reasoned that, “given the lateness
with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly
qualifies for the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of
mind’ been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive
activity.”345 If airport terminals in 1992 could not claim traditional public
forum status, it seems unlikely the Internet would earn the title in 2007,
and unfathomable that a blog would earn the distinction.346
342

See id. at 360.
See Brogan, supra note 320, at *7.
344
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
345
Id. (ellipsis in original).
346
Individuals and groups increasingly use expressions and exchange of ideas in mass
and electronic media to share opinions in the way they used expressions in streets and
parks in the past. See Zatz, supra note 251 at 151. The Supreme Court, however, has
given little heed to such concerns in the traditional public forum analysis. See Lee, 505
U.S. at 696-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court for focusing on historical
pedigree and concluding “open, public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for
discourse may be public forums, whatever their historical pedigree and without concern
for a precise classification of the property.”).
343
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[117] The physical characteristics of the blog alone, however, are not
dispositive of the traditional public forum analysis.347 One must also
consider its location and purpose.348 While the legislator’s blog is hosted
on a government server and is within a government Internet domain, it is
set apart as individual space attributed to the particular legislator.349 The
blog is not like a park where one can loiter and spread his or her
message.350 Instead, the blog is like a bulletin board where one can leave
a message and hope it gains attention.351 This indicates that a blog and
probably the entire Internet cannot be considered traditional public fora –
even if the category were still open to new types of properties – because
their uses are not consistent with those attributed to traditional public
fora.352
[118] Since that door seems closed, the inquiry must proceed to the other
categories. One commentator has offered a test for determining when a
site on the Internet is a designated public forum.353 According to
Goldstone, the site fits this category if it is government owned or
347

United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990).
Id. at 728-29.
349
See Hotel Emples. & Rest. Emples. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Parks & Rec., 311 F.3d 534, 550
(2002) (Lincoln Center is separate from nearby public forum property; accessibility to
local streets is incidental to its design).
350
Navigation in cyberspace is different from navigating the offline world in a way that is
significant for speech. In the offline world, locations are separated by the distance
between them with intervening properties giving each location context. Thus, a
government property physically separated from a public forum property with
characteristics not amenable to speech may be a non-public forum. See Kokinda, 497
U.S. at 727 (holding sidewalk to Post Office entrance non-public forum though municipal
sidewalk located across the parking lot was public forum). Because the “distance”
between two locations on the Internet is simply a different Uniform Resource Locator,
cyberspace eliminates the distance between any two locations and the corresponding time
of travel. Similarly, links on one site may lead directly to another site of which the user
was not aware – making the two sites “close” in the sense that the user need not search
for the second site. “Cyberspace, by contrast [to the offline world], disaggregates internal
features of the place from its spatial characteristics.” See Zatz, supra note 251, at 183-87.
351
See Hotel Emples., 311 F. 3d at 551-52 (though design of the Lincoln Center plaza
allowed pedestrians to pass through, restrictions on expression indicated the
government’s purpose was to conserve it as an extension of the performing arts complex).
352
Reno notably did not apply a public forum analysis. Such analysis would not have
aided the Court’s analysis because history and tradition would not require protecting
speech in such a new forum. See Brogan, supra note 320, at *58.
353
See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 368-69.
348
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controlled, offers unlimited access to recipients of information, and gives
viewpoint-neutral access to a large number of information senders.354 The
legislator in our hypothetical opened the blog in her governmental
capacity, ostensibly for the purpose of allowing any and all of her
constituents to visit the blog and contribute their opinions. This seems to
satisfy Goldstone’s sensible designated public forum test. To classify the
blog as such, however, would provide too much speech protection.
[119] To maintain the efficiency necessary to make this method of
soliciting constituent opinions useful, the legislator would need to place
some limits on blog postings. If the legislator was primarily concerned
with how she should vote on a pending immigration bill, wading through
thousands of comments, for example, about whether to seek funds to
repair a road in Kentucky would undermine the blog’s usefulness to her.
The blog, therefore, should be classified as a limited public forum.355 So
long as they addressed their speech to one of the political topics posed or
permitted for discussion by the legislator,356 speakers in the forum would
be entitled to First Amendment protection.357

354

Id.
The forum should be considered a limited public forum instead of a broader
designated public forum because the legislator, as controller of the forum, can choose the
topics for discussion. See Hotel Emples., 311 F.3d at 545 (government may choose the
speakers and/or subjects permitted in a limited public forum).
356
The legislator could prohibit any speech dealing with other issues with an appropriate
time, place, or manner regulation. See supra note 239. Professor Brogan argues time,
place, or manner regulations are appropriate in parks where they maximize speech by
preventing simultaneous conflicting uses but are unnecessary in the online world where
multiple users can use the same space at the same time. See Brogan, supra note 320, at
*7. His analysis, though generally correct, does not recognize the particular efficiency
concerns needed to make the speech useful and to prevent some posters from overtaking
the blog in the present context.
357
See cf. U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 137
(1981) (“Only where the exercise of First Amendment rights is incompatible with the
normal activity occurring on public property have we held the property is not a public
forum.”)
355
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2. WHY CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE BLOG SHOULD CONCERN
THE LEGISLATOR
[120] A legislator advised that constitutional speech protection will attach
to postings on his blog would ask himself whether he was willing to open
a protected forum for constituents. A legislator whose immediate concern
is an immigration bill should immediately recognize that some
constituents would post messages with incendiary and derogatory
language for all the world to see. The politician would want a moderator
to prevent dissemination of such “harmful” messages.358 This desire to
limit speech conflicts with constitutional protections for speakers in the
forum.359
[121] The constitutional safeguards for speech would prohibit the
legislator from controlling speech on the blog. Our society values a
diversity of opinions, even those most people find odious, to build a
stronger culture.360 Thus, the government is not permitted to censor the
content of speech.361 Accordingly, the government may neither exclude
participants from a forum because of the content of their speech362 nor
delete a viewpoint from a discussion in the forum without violating the
First Amendment.363

358

See DAVIS, supra note 96 at 115.
See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (once the government
voluntarily opens a forum, the government is subject to applicable constitutional
standards for any attempts to exclude speakers).
360
“[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment. . . .” Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
361
See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (“To permit the
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each
individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from
government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control.”).
362
City of Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employ. Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 179
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
363
See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 396.
359
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[122] The easiest case for application of the First Amendment involves
comments critical of the legislator’s performance. While the legislator
might want to censor such comments, he cannot do so. Such criticism is
the essence of our political culture. The government may not exclude
from a forum critical comments addressed to the government acting in its
governmental capacity.364
[123] The criticism example is easy because politicians are expected to
endure public criticism. The harder case involves the desire to censor
speech that is likely to offend some of the legislator’s constituents.
Regardless of the legislator’s purportedly altruistic motive for desiring to
censor such speech, the First Amendment will not permit him to do so.
[124] Government may not permit some speech but deny other speech of
the same nature because the subject of the latter speech is more likely to
produce unpleasant effects.365 Such discrimination based on the content of
the speech is impermissible under the First Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.366 The legislator could
have allowed limited discourse on her blog without opening a public
forum.367 Once she has invited citizen comments on political issues,
however, she cannot constitutionally limit the forum to those with whom
she agrees.368
[125] The legislator, therefore, will be hard pressed to claim a right to
limit or prohibit speech or speakers with whose views she takes issue.369
Our firm constitutional protections for the content of speech virtually

364

See id.
See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100 (stating that picketing only regarding labor disputes
is not allowed); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969) (banning the wearing of arm bands only when done as a silent protest of Vietnam
war is not allowed).
366
See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100.
367
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (stating the government does
not open a public forum by permitting only limited discourse on its property).
368
See Mosley, 400 U.S. at 96 (“Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be
based on content alone . . . .”); see also City of Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (“[w]here the State has opened a forum for
direct citizen involvement,” it cannot exclude a group of citizens from participating).
369
See Goldstone, supra note 323, at 30-31.
365
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eliminate any ability for the legislator to censor or remove postings.370 No
claimed need to limit the forum will protect the legislator because the
reasonableness of a regulation is irrelevant when the government
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint or content.371
[126] The desperate legislator, however, might claim she has a duty to
protect her constituents. Some posters, she will correctly point out, state
their messages in ways highly likely to offend others. The legislator will
claim she must screen messages to ensure they are appropriate for the bulk
of her constituents and remove those that are likely to offend or inflame.
This assertion, however, also fails.
[127] The government may not restrict or punish protected speech in a
public forum because some of the words are unpleasant.372 Similarly, the
government cannot regulate speech simply because it proves embarrassing
to some who hear or see it.373 A restriction on speech is not content
neutral when it is based on another’s reaction to the speech.374 As such,
the fact many might consider the posting or part of it vulgar, crass, or
personally offensive does not deprive the posting of First Amendment
370

See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995)
(“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive
content or the message it conveys.”); see generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870
(1997) (stating that content-based regulations raise special First Amendment concerns
because of the chilling effect they have on speech). The discussion of “censoring”
speech, while generally addressed to removal or alteration of posted material, would also
extend to prohibiting speech from being posted at all. Such censorship is unconstitutional
whether done manually or through computer software screening out certain words or
phrases. The First Amendment does not permit prior restraints prohibiting speech merely
because the government objects to the planned message. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
371
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (viewpoint);
see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 879 (content).
372
See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590 (1969) (involving the public burning
of the flag while shouting: “We don’t need no damn flag . . . . [I]f they let that happen to
[civil rights activist James] Meredith, we don’t need an American flag.”); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 17 (1971) (involving the wearing of a jacket with the words
“Fuck the draft” on back in courthouse).
373
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (involving a parody ad
suggesting minister lost his virginity to his mother in a fly-infested outhouse)).
374
See id. at 754-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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protection.375 In public fora, individuals are expected to avoid or ignore
speech they do not want to hear or see.376 The legislator, therefore, cannot
censor comments on her blog.
3. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR COMPUTER SERVICE PROVIDERS
UNDERMINE ANY CLAIMED NEED FOR THE LEGISLATOR TO CENSOR HER
BLOG
[128] The legislator may assert, though, that the worldwide visibility of
blog postings makes removal or alteration of postings appropriate to
protect her against potential legal liability for assertions made on the blog.
When applying such a content-based restriction on speech, the legislator
must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard by demonstrating her action is
necessary to serve a compelling interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.377 Because of the statutory protection afforded to computer
service providers, the legislator cannot meet this test.
[129] Congress has recognized the Internet as “a forum for a true diversity
of political discourse….”378 In order to protect the forum, in the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”),379 “Congress granted most
Internet services immunity from liability for publishing false or
defamatory material so long as the information was provided by another
party.”380 In the CDA, Congress provided: “No provider or user of an

375

See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25 (“[I]t is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity
is another’s lyric.”); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (“Indeed, [the Supreme Court has
previously] admonished that ‘the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it.’”) (citations omitted).
376
See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course, the Supreme Court
has held certain language cannot be broadcast over the airwaves during times when
children were likely to be listening. See FCC v. Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50
(1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (George Carlin’s “seven words you can never
say on television” routine). The Court, however, based its ruling on the fact the airwaves
are “invasive,” in that one could unintentionally encounter the profanity by just scanning
radio stations. Id. No such concerns exist in the present context. The Internet user must
have the URL for the legislator’s blog and intentionally choose to visit the site.
377
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
378
47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (1998).
379
47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006).
380
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
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interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider.”381
[130] An “interactive computer service,” the service one must provide or
use in order to receive the CDA’s protection, is defined as “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet . . .
.”382 An “information content provider” is “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.”383
[131] Courts have not yet addressed the applicability of § 230 to blogs.
The statute, though, likely protects bloggers. By setting up an electronic
location where multiple users may converge, a blogger becomes a
“provider of an interactive computer service.”384 Such postings on a blog
appear to constitute information provided by a third party for which the
blogger is immune.385
[132] As such, § 230(c) gives the legislator-blogger full immunity so long
as a third party voluntarily provides “the essential published content.”386
The legislator, by controlling the topics for discussion, does not become a
content provider and thereby lose the benefit of statutory protection. Such
a claim was rejected in Carafano v. Matchmaker.com, Inc. Carafano
claimed Matchmaker.com, a dating website, was an information content
provider because it created a survey, including the possible responses to
multiple choice questions, an individual completed to post a profile falsely
using Carafano’s identity. The court, however, ruled Matchmaker.com
381
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Internet service provider, the site creator is a “user.” See id. (citing Ben Ezra, Weinstein,
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See Peterson, supra note 175, at 44.
386
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did not provide any content because the third party, not the website, made
the selections and wrote the essays that constituted the profile. As such,
Matchmaker.com was not an information content provider and, therefore,
was immune from liability under § 230(c).387
[133] Section 230 immunity from liability destroys the legislator’s claimed
compelling interest in censoring postings on his blog. Because the
legislator will not face liability for the content of the postings, he has no
reason acceptable under modern First Amendment jurisprudence for
exercising censorship. The politician seeking to use the Internet to reach
out to constituents simply has no concerns to balance against citizens’
speech rights.388
[134] To the contrary, a legislator who attempts to censor or alter postings
may face legal liability. The Ninth Circuit has held that:
[A] service provider or user is immune from liability under
§ 230(c)(1) when a third person or entity that created or
developed the information in question furnished it to the
provider or user under circumstances in which a reasonable
person in the position of the service provider or user would
conclude that the information was provided for publication
on the Internet or other “interactive computer service.”389
This suggests bloggers who edit third-party postings become speakers and,
at least in some courts, lose their protection against liability.390
[135] Still, the legislator might point to courts that reached a contrary
conclusion, holding a service provider could edit messages without losing
his immunity. Because § 230 protects against liability for editorial
387

Id.; see also Gentry v. Ebay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 703, 717-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(online auction site immune where it simply compiled ratings information provided by
customers).
388
Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1989) (noting university has right to make
academic judgments on how to allocate scarce resources).
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Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003).
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See Peterson, supra note 175, at 45-46; see also Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport
Sys., Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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functions related to the traditional role of a publisher,391 the Ninth Circuit
ruled that one who makes only “minor alterations” to a posting did not
“develop” the content so as to become the “information content
provider.”392 According to the Ninth Circuit, the issue for immunity
purposes is one of degree in altering the material.393 A New Jersey state
court went so far as to ignore any consideration of degree in affording
immunity. That court held the operator of a bulletin board system immune
under § 230 even though he edited a message to remove profanity and
shaped the content of other messages.394
[136] Whatever merit those approaches might have when dealing with the
private sector, they cannot allow the legislator as government agent to
censor messages.395 Congress intended § 230 to reflect its desire to
protect computer service providers from tort liability in order to avoid the
chilling effect such liability would have on speech. Thus, Congress
intended § 230 to permit more speech on the Internet with minimal
government interference consistent with the goals of the First Amendment
rather than to allow service providers to limit speech.396
[137] Permitting a legislator to control the content of postings would not
serve the purposes of either § 230 or the First Amendment. Such control
would allow the legislator to remove speech – core political speech – from
the marketplace of ideas. This limitation would serve no compelling
purpose. As set out above, the legislator faces no liability for any of the
content third parties posted on her blog.397
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[138] Further, no other legitimate, much less compelling, reason exists for
censoring the postings. When the politician creates an open forum where
constituents can come, go, and speak as they please, readers are unlikely
to view comments posted on the blog as being those of or reflecting the
opinions of the legislator.398 Instead, viewers of expression made up of
many individual parts generally understand that each component of the
whole offers its own perspective on the overall theme.399 Moreover, one
might question whether any harm results from negative postings on a blog.
Blogs are fora for opinion whose typical messages – often filled with poor
grammar and spelling and often vulgar and offensive content – lack the
indicia of facts or reliability on which reasonable persons rely when
evaluating information sources.400
[139] Finally, and most importantly, no need exists for censorship in the
blog context. The Internet allows any politician or other viewer who
wishes to distance himself or herself from another’s posting to respond
instantly in the same forum and to the same audience. Rather than
needing to censor potentially unpopular views, a politician and any readers
of his blog have the ability to “set the record straight” by declaring his or
her position on statements made in constituent postings.401
[140] The legislator simply cannot demonstrate a compelling interest in
censoring constituent postings on her blog. The postings are unlikely to
be attributed to the legislator and, even if they were, she would be immune
from liability for their content. Further, she has the option of responding
directly to the viewing audience, allowing the legislator to protect her
reputation by disavowing unwanted speech.402 As such, once the
398
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See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 465-66 (Del. 2005) (collecting cases).
401
Id. at 464 (noting one allegedly defamed by blog postings has powerful remedy in
ability to respond to defamatory comments).
402
Significantly, even if the blog were held to be a non-public forum such that a speech
restriction must only be reasonable, the legislator probably still could not censor postings.
Posting on a blog is much like leafletting in a public place, as one simply leaves a
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legislator opens the forum for political discussion, the First Amendment
will prohibit her from exercising any control over the content of postings
addressed to the topics she raises or permits for discussion.
IV. CONCLUSION
[141] The Internet has become a powerful tool for spreading messages
around town and around the world. Blogs have made it possible for this
communication to be truly interactive, letting people express their
opinions on issues raised by someone else in the same forum where the
issue was initially presented. This has created a revolution in how
information is disseminated, already challenging the established media.
The revolution is not, however, likely to alter our political processes.
[142] Blogs could make direct communication between legislator and
constituent simple and efficient. A legislator could ask constituents
whether he should, for example, support spending tax dollars to construct
a fence along the border with Mexico to keep out illegal immigrants. This
has facial appeal. Many citizens would perceive the legislator who
allowed such interaction as truly concerned about the desires of the
People. Still, the large downside probably will keep any legislator from
setting up such a blog.
[143] At a theoretical level, engaging in such direct communication may
be objectionable because it is subject to some of the same concerns that
led the Framers to avoid direct democracy. The legislator who solicits
opinions might feel he or she has to abide by the wishes of the majority.
By doing so, the legislator would facilitate the tyranny of the majority the
Framers sought to avoid.
[144] Most important for present purposes are the First Amendment
implications of setting up the blog. Though it exists only in a digital
message for others to see and hopes it draws attention. Even in a non-public forum, a ban
on distributing leaflets may be unreasonable and invalid. See Int’l Society for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 689-90 (1992) (ban on leaflets not reasonably
related to preserving mall-like atmosphere of airport terminal). Further, government
regulation of speech simply because some members of the public might disagree with it is
invalid even in non-public fora. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 760 n.13
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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realm, the blog still would be treated under the typical public forum
analysis. This would result in classifying the blog as a limited public
forum at which the legislator’s constituents could post their feelings
regarding the topics posed by the legislator – no matter how offensive,
virulent, or crass – for all the world to see. Because the postings are
political speech, they would be protected by the First Amendment.
[145] The legislator, because of the First Amendment protection, would be
unable to remove or alter the offensive postings. He could not
demonstrate any compelling need to remove the postings, particularly
since he is protected by the Communications Decency Act from any
liability for statements posted on his blog. The First Amendment would
require the legislator to permit all postings relevant to topics permitted for
discussion on the blog to remain visible to the entire world.
[146] This loss of control over their messages will cause politicians to
avoid blogging with constituents. Only the rarest politician would be
willing to become associated with comments some will view as offensive
or incendiary. In this context, application of First Amendment principles
will have the perverse effect of reducing speech permitted in the
marketplace. Whatever the potential of blogs, then, their impact is
unlikely to alter the relationship between legislator and constituent.
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